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Abstract
This paper addresses “Maritime Security and Possible Cooperation
between China and Japan,” and seeks to look for possible solvency in
the bilateral relations.While emphasizing nowadays confrontational
aspects of the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands, I could say
that the East China Sea has often been viewed as “the Sea of Friendship
and Cooperation.” The paper touches on the ownership issues of the
islands on the one hand, but all participants recognize that we cannot
converge the bilateral relations into the Senkaku/Diaoyudao.
It also addresses such issues as exclusive economic zones (EEZ),
freedom of navigation, possible joint exploration of energy, and envi-
ronmental collaborations between China and Japan. It will also touch
on the method of avoiding the seemingly unrelated linkage between
maritime issues and economic trade, and seeks to look for the ways to
clam down the emotional reactions by both countries, and to avoid the
convergence of substantially plural exchanges of goods and services
into issues of the islands where only goats live.
Deng Xiaoping once said that “next generations” will have better
wisdom. To attain this purpose, we must have our own wisdom by
which the next generations will be able to create the better wisdom
than us.
Keywords : maritime security, JapanChina relations, EEZ, East China
Sea, South China Sea
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I. Introduction
During my June 2012 trip to Honolulu, Hawaii, after seven year’s
absence, I met an old friend of mine currently working for the Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies, an academic instititute under the
jurisdiction of the US Defense Department. The friend is originally
from the Philippines, and we came to discuss issues on maritime secu-
rity in the East and South China Seas.
In the conversation, we agreed on one point. The Philippines have
territorial disputes on the Spratly islands and Scarborough reef with
China, and in the ChinesePhilippino territorial negotiations, China
often refers to a variety of classical documents and writings indicating
that Chinese used to live in the contentious places hundreds of years
ago. I also hear the same claims of China’s reference at various times to
old writings from Malaysians and Vietnamese whose governments
have had similar territorial conflicts with China. It can be argued that
China’s reference to old writings has been their strategy to justify their
holdings of the islands.
II. Legal Aspects and Identity Politics
Senkaku is not an exception. The Chinese government often refers to
those writings back in the Ming Dynasty, and sometimes in the Han
Dynasty period. In Europe, however, Italy has never mentioned the
Roman Empire to justify their holdings of various lands in Europe.1
Simply said, the Roman Empire was a classical event, and it is
techinically impossible for Italy to claim ownership of the European
places because the Empire was just a part history before international
law was created. In this sense, China’s reference to classical writings
makes no sense in terms of international law. Moreover, China’s high-
handed behaviors on maritime issues in the East and South China Seas
not just toward Japan but also toward Vietnam, the Philippines,
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Malaysia, and other ASEAN countries will invite China’s isolation in
international relations of Asia.
On the issue of the Senkaku disputes, the legal position of Japan is
that neither China nor Taiwan made any claim from 1895 to 1971 and
that therefore the Japanese government’s position is fundamentally
solid and quite tenable under existing international law.2 In addition,
the Chinese leadership did not initially place this issue at the center of
the relationship. Deng Xiaoping proposed in 1978 “to leave this issue to
the wisdom of the next generations” at the concluding stage of the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The Japanese government, although
having not officially agreed on “leaving the ownership issue & the next
generation, echoed this position and basically kept the islands re-
stricted, even for Japanese nationals, a policy very different from the
Russians’ (in the northern territories) and Koreans’ (in Takeshima)
efforts in exploiting in full the islands under their respective govern-
ance.3
But with the rise of China in the 1990’s, the Chinese side began to
claim these islands more openly, and this was responded to with spo-
radic actions by some nationalists in Japan. Finally, in September 2010
the collision of a Chinese fishery vessel and a Japanese coast guard ship
heightened the tensions between the two countries and left an impres-
sion on the Japanese side that, if mishandled, this issue can become the
causes of military conflict for the two countries. Completely different
perceptions of the islands then emerged in Japan, as the Senkakus came
to be considered one of the most serious security dangers in the region.
Historically speaking, the Senkaku disputes started at the end of
the 1960s when it was discovered that there might be substantial oil
resources beneath the islands. Taiwan and China began to claim owner-
ship in 1971 (in June by Taiwan, and in December by China), despite the
rejection of the Japanese government, whose jurisdiction had been
unchallenged since 1895, including during the postwar years from 1945
onward. So the disputes started as an energy-related political, not legal,
issue, but given some complexity in the claims that existed before 1895,
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the issue has the danger to turn into a historical memory issue for
China.4 History issues have been quite delicate for Japan-China rela-
tions, and if the dominance of legal aspects in the Senkaku disputes
yields to the emphasis on history issues, the Senkaku disputes can
become another example of identity politics for both countries, and
sporadic nationalistic movements, most of which are too complicated to
resolve, may occur.5 Thus, in today’s bilateral relations where the gen-
eral public in both countries can easily become nationalistic, the emer-
gence of identity politics stemming from history issues should be
avoided.
Territorial disputes have three characteristics. One is a legal as-
pect. Regarding Senkaku, even the Chinese government stated that the
islands belonged to Japan before December 1971. But, if the issue be-
comes a part of identity politics (the second characteristic), another
aspect relating to history will emerge. The third is a political aspect in
which we can conduct dislogues so that we could avoid the use of force
in resolving territorial disputes.
III. A Brief History of the Dispute and Possible Political
Solvency
On April 20 and June 11, 1971, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry first men-
tioned the ownership of the Diaoyutai. On December 30, China’s For-
eign Ministry refereed to the ownership for the first time since the end
of the Pacific War. On September 29, 1972, Japan normalized its diplo-
matic relations with Mainland China, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue
was not discussed by Tokyo and Beijing with normalization. Deng
Xiaoping proposed in 1978 “to leave this issue to the wisdom of the next
generations” at a press conference when he visited Tokyo to sign the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
However, the issue became more contentious during the 1990’s, and
the following is a detailed look at a series of events for the past two
decades:
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( 1 ) In February 1992, China’s National People’s Congress stipu-
lated China’s Law of Territorial Seas which said that
Diaoyudao belongs to China.
( 2 ) China’s stipulation of the Territorial Seas affected Japan’s
right-wing activities. In July 1996, the second lighthouse was
constructed on one of the Senkaku islands. And in Septem-
ber, five members of the Japan Youth Society (日本青年社)
landed on the island.
( 3 ) After July 1996, this kind of seemingly right-wing activity
did not occur. In 1997, both the Japanese and the Chinese
governments agreed on fishery areas (in the northern areas
of 27th parallel north, which did not include the Senkakus,
but both governments certainly sought to make an agree-
ment on the East China Sea.), and sought to maintain the flag
state doctrine regarding the management of fishery boats.
( 4 ) In order to maintain the order stipulated in the 1997 fishery
framwork, the Japanese government, in October 2002, decided
to make a lease contract of the Senkakus with their owner,
Kunioki Kurihara (栗原国起). The Chinese side condemned
the Japanese, but the Japanese government, by making the
contract, made it unlawful for Japanese fishermen to enter
the contentious areas to catch fish. Thus, the Japanese side
sought not to provoke China with this lease contract.
( 5 ) On March 24, 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on
Diaoyudao, and Japan’s coast guard and Okinawa’s police
department arrested them. But, Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka did not prose-
cute them. Rather, the Japanese side enforced their repatria-
tion to Shanghai. The fact that the prosecution did not occur
was quite different from the 2010 case.
( 6 ) On December 8, 2008, China’s two vessels for marine investi-
gations navigated in Japan’s territorial seas for nine hours
and a half (this action itself is not against the international
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Law of the Sea, as long as the navigation is an innocent
passage), and stayed close to the Daiaoyudao for about one
hour and circulated itself clockwise around the island (this
action is not an innocent passge, and completely against in-
ternational law. The stay is possible only within the area of
territorial seas.). Against Japan’s critics, China’s Foreign
Ministry stated that, “given the effective control needed over
the islands to justify China’s ownership, China is ready to
indicate its presence and conduct effective management.”6
( 7 ) On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishery boat rammed Ja-
pan’s coast guard, the images captured on camera and posted
on Youtube.
( 1 ) and ( 2 ) resulted in escalating the tension, while ( 3 ) worked
for calming it. ( 4 ) has different interpretations between Japan and
China, but the Japanese government’s lease contract resulted in pre-
venting Japanese fishermen from entering the contentious areas not to
provoke China. ( 5 ) indicated an aspect of Chinese activists’ extrem-
ism, but Japan’s addressing the issue was wise enough not to politicize
the tention. However, in the ( 6 ) event, the Chinese side started to
justify not just the ownership of the islands from a legal perspective,
but rather their seemingly militaristic actions and behaviors, while to
( 7 ) reminded the Japanese government of ( 6 ), and the Japanese gov-
ernment started to think that China’s strategy had altered in a more
belligerent direction.
The urgency of addressing the Senkaku Islands dispute is plainly
obvious: the islands now run the risk of causing a violent conflict be-
tween Japan and China. In a situation where Japan’s actual ownership
and legal position are solid, there is no reason to give up its ownership,
and, in fact, sound defense policy is needed to maintain the status quo.
But, it is not enough only to claim the legal ownership as seen in vari-
ous Japanese newspapers.
The argument that legal claims are not enough for the Japanese
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government has two implications. First, in the political context, it
seems that China started not only to move forward to justify their legal
ownership, but also has moved to more belligerent behaviors as the rise
of China becomes more apparent. Second, however, Japan’s relentless
repetition that there are no territorial disputes over Senkaku can be
recognized as an insult by the Chinese, since Japanese at various times
have been told the same thing over the northern territorial issues by the
Soviets/Russians. Legally speaking, the northern territories should
belong to the Japanese, but if the country having effective control only
continues to say that there is no territorial dispute, the counterpart who
has lost the effective control should feel greatly humiliated.7
All-out diplomacy should precede any military conflict between the
two countries. This is of highest priority, all the more so because, given
the overall phenomenon of the rise of China, Japan has no time to lose
on failed diplomacy or risking the lives of Japanese and Chinese young-
sters on account of islands where only wild goats have effectively been
living for many decades until now.
IV. How Universal or Particular Are China’s Claims in
Maritime Security in Asia?: “Maritime Security
Problems” Have Been “China Problems”
As its economic rise has become more salient, China has been inter-
ested in expanding its maritime interests. Despite its territorial breadth
on the ground, the size of China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are
smaller than that of Japan. To sustain its economy whose population
counts ten times as large as Japan, China has become quite assertive
since the 1990’s in obtaining as well as maintaining fishery rights, natu-
ral resources on the seabed, and possible oil well underneath. Because
of its geographical outreach, China has caused a variety of problems
with neighboring countries.8 The well-known “history problems” in
Asia cannot be applied only to China-Japan relations. Other than with
Japan, China has raised issues relating to history in international
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negotiations with South Korea, Russia, Vietnam, India, Central Asian
countries, and others. For instance, “history issues” have also existed in
Japan’s relations with the United States, but the “issues” have NOT that
often shown up as “problems” under the banner of the bilateral partner-
ship. That is, it can be argued that “history problems” have been par-
ticular phenomena raised by the Chinese government. Moreover, China
has caused not just ground border conflicts but also maritime territorial
problems with the neighboring countries.9 In its negotiations with
Japan, the Senkaku Islands disputes have been a typical case. On Sep-
tember 7, 2010, China’s fishing trawlers entered the disputed area near
the islands, and one of the fishing boat collided with Japan’s coast guard
patrol vessels. Japan’s coast guard boarded the Chinese ship, and ar-
rested its captain, who then came to be released on September 24.
Against this incident, the Chinese government issued a strong pro-
test against the Japanese government. Their ground for protest is that
the Senkaku Islands are within China’s territory. Strangely enough,
however, until December 1971 when the Chinese government declared
the territorial rights over the Senkaku, a variety of official Chinese
governmental documents indicated that the islands were under the
territorial domination of Japan.10
Even more important in China’s approaches to maritime interests in
the surrounding seas has been recent disputes between Beijing and
several other Asian governments over ownership of islands in the
South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian observers have seen this dis-
pute as a litmus test for a newly-strong China’s relations with its
smaller neighbors: whether China would use its formidable military
power to attempt to intimidate the other claimants, or settle the matter
peacefully through good-faith negotiations. Vietnamese who fear long-
term Chinese intentions see in the Spratly and Paracel Islands disputes
a harsh and sometimes violent counterpoint to China’s Asia-Pacific
“smile diplomacy.”
Moreover in negotiations with South Korea, China also has had
territorial disputes over a small island (argued by the South Korean
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government) in the northern East China Sea for long years. Judging
from all of these territorial disputes as well as the gradual expansion of
its maritime interests, I can argue that “maritime security problems”
have been what has been raised particularly by China.11
V. Crisis Management in the Past and China’s Claims
On these maritime disputes, Japan, China, and neighboring coun-
tries have suggested several methods for crisis management.
The first is intentional delay of the disputes. Regarding the
Senkaku Islands, when Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in August 1978 for
the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty, he mentioned at a press
conference that the issue should not be addressed either by China or
Japan for the time being. It was wise for both countries under the
banner of the bilateral friendship to delay the possible conflict toward
the future.12
The second is to show compromises. In the case of the East China
Sea, Japan’s EEZ overlaps with China’s, and Japan has suggested the
middle-line between the marginal line of Japan’s EEZ and that of
China’s. Against Japan’s suggestion for seemingly compromise, how-
ever, China has argued that the marginal line of the continental shelf
reaching out close to Okinawa, which lasts longer than 200 miles from
the Chinese continent, should have been under China’s control.
Strangely enough, however, China has claimed the continental shelf
against Japan over the East China Sea, while arguing against Vietnam
that the medium-line of the EEZ should be the basis of the bilateral
maritime interests with Vietnam.13 That is, China has employed contra-
dictory approaches toward its maritime interests, depending on the
usefulness of its tactics in international negotiations.
The third method is the gradual making of norms regarding the
conduct of concerned countries over the disputed areas. As far as the
South China Sea is concerned, China signed the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, and also de-
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clared its readiness to establish the specific action norms for the
security of the South China Sea in 2007. However, for the recent few
years, a number of Chinese military vessels as well as submarines have
appeared in the disputed area. There is a tendency regarding China’s
gradual entry into the South China Sea that fishing trawlers first come
to the hotspot, then vessels to patrol the fishing trawlers show up, and
finally military vessels appear, the gradation process of which should
have become more fearful for neighboring countries as time goes by.14
That is, China has been making use of the “carrot and stick” diplo-
macy. It sometimes conducts “smile diplomacy” to make agreements
with countries in dispute.15 But, the agreements do not last for long, and
then strong claims on the territorial dominations will be indicated in
bilateral negotiations. Here, China often emphasizes the historical leg-
acy of the territories. It usually argues that it was Chinese who used to
stay in such hotspots. They often cite classical Chinese writings as
what justifies China’s territorial rights. As the continental Asia used to
be influenced culturally by the Chinese empire, it is common that a
variety of writings exist in China about the movement of Chinese to the
hotspots. It is questionable, however, that such classical writings can be
effective in claiming China’s territorial rights under the principles of
the modern international law.16
VI. The U. S.Japan Partnership for Maritime Security in
the East and the South China Seas
First of all, regarding the Senkaku issues, it has been well-known
that Article 5 of the U. S.Japan Security Treaty could touch on the
possibility of the U. S. government’s intervention. The article says that
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the com-
mon danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and pro-
cesses.” That is, as long as the U. S. government recognizes that
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Senkaku belongs to the Japanese terriroty, it will make sense that Japan
would seek American support to maintain Japan’s territorial rights over
the islands.
Second, since China seeks to broaden its maritime interests by
claiming its territories, it is necessary for Japan (and the United States)
to continue to argue the importance of “freedom of navigation” in the
disputed area. That is, “freedom of navigation” has been one of signifi-
cant rules of international law, and by making use of the international
logic, we should avoid being entangled into China’s claim on “terri-
torial sovereignty.” Regarding the South China Sea which the U. S.
Japan security treaty does not directly address, but China prefers not to
have the U. S. intervened, the possible geographical enlargement be-
yond the U. S.Japan security treaty will become important. It does not
imply the alliance’s military outreach, but rather seeks to disseminate
universal aspects of the U. S.Japan alliance toward the countries con-
cerned about maritime security in the region. Such functional outreach
could seek to include China as a significant member, but if China dis-
likes to join the joint settings (or institutions, if the functions of the
U. S.Japan alliance could be outreached more widely), the U. S.Japan
cooperation, together with neighboring countries, could present itself as
a kind of stick against China’s particularism.
More specifically, there will be three methods to realize the effec-
tive (and also functional) enlargement of the U. S.Japan partnership to
address the maritime security. First, both the U. S. and the Japanese
governments should welcome Australia’s entry into a variety of mari-
time security issues in the disputed areas. In July 2011, the trilateral
military exercises were conducted near the South China Sea, and the
event significantly affected the Chinese perceptions of its strategy to-
ward the South China Sea.17 Because of its geographical closeness, Aus-
tralia has been interested in engaging in Asian affairs since the 1980’s,
and the Australian interests toward Asia will fit with those of the U. S.
and Japan for the security of the archipelago areas in Southeast Asia.
While seeing the rise of China as a possible chance to boost their econo-
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mies, the ASEAN countries have sought to avoid the gradual intimi-
dation by China regarding their economic connections with China.
That is, for the ASEAN members to hedge various risks stemming from
China’s excessive rise, it is wise to maintain their relations with bigger
powers like Australia, the United States, and Japan. For Australia
which during the Premier Howard years showed its readiness to enter
the East Asian Summit, it will also be beneficial to join the making of
Asia’s regional frameworks. In this sense, Australia’s participation
cannot be what seeks to contain China against other Asian countries.18
Second, it is important for both the U. S. and Japan to think about
broadening their cooperation beyond the U. S.Australia-Japan trilater-
alism, and to seek to globalize the universal aspects of maritime secu-
rity with other neighboring countries. Such members as South Korea
and Taiwan, and possibly Vietnam as well, in terms of sealane security,
can think about the importance of security in the East and the South
China Seas. That is, the more region-wide dissemination of the mari-
time security will enable the participating countries to emphasize the
universal elements of the sea as commons.19
Finally, the ultimate globalization of the maritime security will be
the application of the rule of maritime law, and the extent to which we
could engage China into the international framework will become a
litmus test to judge China’s real intention of the “carrot and stick” diplo-
macy. China has often emphasized the historical justification of the
surrounding seas, which the neighboring countries regard as irrelevant.
How much of our efforts can bring China into the “global standard” of
maritime security will be the key for the future stability and prosperity
of the Asia-Pacific as a whole.
VII. Conclusion
From legal perspectives on the Senkaku islands, Japan’s position
has been far more solid than China’s. Japan, however, should move
forward to think about the future of the bilateral relationship. If the oil
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resources are real, it is possible that both Japan and China will be able
to contribute to the more general energy issues existing in the world.
It is not just China, but also Taiwan which has claimed ownership of the
Senkaku islands. Thus, without intervening in any of diplomatic rela-
tions between Beijing and Taipei, the Japanese government could invite
the actors concerned to conduct dialogues on the territorial disputes.
Japan’s current repetition that there has been no territorial dispute
has been seen by Chinese as an insult. Also, Japan’s unwillingness to
engage in diplomatic actions over the disputed islands, while at the
same time emphasizing its legitimacy only from legal perspectives, will
invite its own immoblism in foreign policy in today’s changing interna-
tional relations.
With this historic recognition, in addition to the security danger
discussed above, it is essential that the Japanese government accept the
existence of the Senkaku Islands issue as a subject of dialogue (not
necessarily as a subject of disputes), while also implementing a credible
defense policy in the region. Eventually the possibility of joint energy
exploitation could seriously be considered, so that “next generations”
― following Deng’s statement in 1978 ― will finally find the wisdom to
look for any solution.20
1 Some Japanese authors even argue that China’s reference to Ming Dy-
nasty’s writings have fatal flaws. 下條正男 ｢『尖閣は明代から中国領』 の真っ
赤な嘘｣ 『正論』 2012年 5月号｡
2 See the attached maps and articles. Reference 1 is a map jointly published
by Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and China’s Institute for
Geoscience in 1964, and Reference 2 is a map which appeared in Washington
Post in 1969, but the original map was produced by the PRC. Reference 3
is an article in Renmin Ribao in 1953, indicating that Senkaku belongs to
Japan. These are a fraction of the documents scholars and diplomats
around me usually circulate on the Senkaku disputes.
3 In this sense, I argue that Japan’s methods of effective control over the
disputed islands have been much softer (or nave from a difference per-
spective) than Russia and South Korea.
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Notes
4 Japanese need to become more aware that the process by which Japan
annexed these islands at the time of its victory in the first SinoJapanese
War resembles very closely the process of annexing Takeshima. The Sen-
kakus’ acquisition in January 1895 preceded Taiwan’s acquisition through
the Shimonoseki Treaty of April 1895, just as Takeshima’s annexation
preceded the annexation of Korea itself.
5 For instance, Japan has had history problems with the United States on the
issue of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, thanks for the
bilateral allied partnership that has lasted for more than a half century, the
issue rarely becomes too political. Japan’s relations with China have not
been that easy, since history issues have often been linked with political
claims by the Chinese government. It is now time that the Japan-China
bilateral relationship should enter a more mature stage where we can
avoid emotional identity politics.
6 東郷和彦 『日本の領土問題』 角川新書, 2012年, 138頁｡
7 When Gromyko was the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, he repeated
insultingly to the Japanese that there has been no territorial dipute over
the northern islands. However, if the recognition of the territorial disputes
cannot alter the contensions claime by both sides into a more stable situa-
tion, it only works disadvantageously for the country having effective
control. Thus, the recognition must be conducted with care.
8 Michael Glosny, Phillip Saunders and Robert Ross, “Debating China’s
Naval Nationalism,” International Security, 352 (Fall, 2010), pp. 16175.
9 However, many of ground territorial issues have been resolved during the
Hu Jingtao period. The remaining issue still exists only in China-Japan and
China-India relations.
10 See attached reference. It should be emphasized that such maps of the
Senkaku belonging to Japan, were quite often published by the PRC gov-
ernment at that time.
11 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 272 (2005), pp. 30522.
12 However, it is not clear even now if Deng’s statement had been agreed with
the Japanese government before his press release. When the Senkaku
incident occurred in September 2010, the Chinese government condemned
Japan for violating the agreement of NOT touching on the Senkaku issues.
Against this condemnation, the Japanese government recently says that
there has been no agreement on this matter during the 1970’s.
13 Rommel Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Environment In The East And South
China Sea” paper presented at the International Conference on Maritime
Security Environment in East Asian Waters organized by the Ocean Policy
Research Foundation (OPRF), Tokyo, Japan on 1617 February 2011.
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14 New York Times, April 23, 2010.
15 More specifically, China tends to indicate softer diplomacy when the U. S.
government shows its readiness to intervene. Before that stage comes,
however, China prefers bilateral negotiations over the disputed areas.
16 Rommel Banlaoi, op. cit.
17 One significant element in the South China Sea has been that since 1992
when the U. S. military withdrew from the Philippines, there has been no
U. S. military base in Southeast Asia.
18 However, various articles written by Chinese scholars tend to emphasize
aspects of containment against China in the U. S.AustraliaJapan trilateral
cooperation. See Sheldon Simon, “The United States, Japan, and Australia:
Security Linkages to Southeast Asia,” paper presented for the conference
entitled New Security Environment ― Implications for American Security in
the Asia Pacific Region, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, The
National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 45 2011.
19 I would like to thank Admiral Yoji Koda for providing me with this com-
ment. In my understanding, he argues the nature of collectivity in the
U. S.Japan alliance, and emphasizes the importance of broadening the
U. S.Japan partnership toward other neighboring countries.
20 However, I do not address here what percentage of the fruit of the joint
exploitation, if the oil resources become real, will be given to both Japanese
and Chinese. The so-called “relative gain” issues will become a source of
contention for the bilateral relationship. It may be, however, too early to
argue issues of the portion before we could find the real oil. Also, the same
logic of conducting dialogue should be applied to the Spratly islands, and
China needs to conduct dialogues with its neighboring countries.
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